Endogenous On-the-job Search and Frictional Wage Dispersion by Hertweck, Matthias S.
 
 
 
Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Zentrum (WWZ) der Universität Basel 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
February 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Endogenous On-the-job Search and Frictional 
Wage Dispersion
 
 
 
WWZ Discussion Paper 2010/02 
(SNF) Matthias S. Hertweck 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Author: 
 
Matthias Hertweck  
Center of Business and Economics (WWZ) 
University of Basel. Peter Merian-Weg 6 
CH - 4002 Basel 
matthias.hertweck@unibas.ch 
www.hertweck.org 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
      
      
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A publication of the Center of Business and Economics (WWZ), University of Basel.  
 
© The author(s). Reproduction for other purposes than the personal use needs the permission of the 
author(s). 
 
Endogenous On-the-job Search and Frictional Wage
Dispersion∗
Matthias S. Hertweck†
University of Basel & IfW
This Version: February 2, 2010
Abstract
This paper addresses the large degree of frictional wage dispersion in US data.
The standard job matching model without on-the-job search cannot replicate this
pattern. With on-the-job search, however, unemployed job searchers are more will-
ing to accept low wage offers since they can continue to seek for better employment
opportunities. This explains why observably identical workers may be paid very dif-
ferently. Therefore, we examine the quantitative implications of on-the-job search
in a stochastic job matching model. Our key result is that the inclusion of variable
on-the-job search increases the degree of frictional wage dispersion by an order of a
magnitude.
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1 Introduction
This paper addresses the large degree of frictional wage dispersion found in US data
(Hornstein et al. 2007). The standard job matching model without on-the-job search
cannot replicate this pattern. With on-the-job search, however, unemployed job searchers
are more willing to accept low wage offers since they can continue to seek for better
employment opportunities. This explains why observably identical workers may be paid
very different wages. Therefore, we examine the quantitative implications of on-the-job
search (Nagypál 2005) in a stochastic job matching model (Mortensen & Pissarides 1994).
Our key result is that the inclusion of variable on-the-job search increases the degree of
frictional wage dispersion by an order of a magnitude.
Hornstein et al. (2007) study frictional wage dispersion, i.e. wage differentials among
observably identical workers, using a “mean-min-ratio” which relates the average wage
paid to the lowest wage in the sample. They find that the mean-min-ratio takes values
of 1.7 and above in US data. Adopting the framework of Mortensen & Pissarides (1994),
the authors then examine the decision problem of an unemployed job searcher assuming
that there is no aggregate uncertainty. Each firm-worker pair is characterized by an
idiosyncratic productivity level. The worker and the firm form a match if and only
if it yields a positive surplus and the wage rate of the worker is determined by Nash
bargaining. Hornstein et al. (2007) demonstrate that unemployed job searchers are only
willing to accept low wage offers if either (i) the job offer arrival rate is very low or
(ii) the expected wage contract is very short. The former case implies that unemployed
workers desperately accept any wage offer. Shimer (2007) estimates these values, where,
consistent with the model presented, the possibility of direct flows from one employer to
another is not taken into account. He finds that 45% of all unemployed workers find a
new job within one month, while the average job duration is estimated to be about 2
1/2 years. Using these estimates, Hornstein et al. (2007) find that the model generated
mean-min-ratio is not significantly different from unity.
This paper considers frictional wage dispersion in a model with on-the-job search. This
seems to be a natural choice, given that the number of employed workers who change
employer each month is about twice as large as the flow of unemployed job searchers
into employment (Fallick & Fleischman 2004). The introduction of direct employment-
to-employment1 transitions has the potential to increase the degree of frictional wage
dispersion for two reasons. First, unemployed job searchers who accept (temporarily) a
low-wage job offer do not lose the option of labor market search. Hence, they may accept
low wage offers for the moment, but continue to seek for better employment opportunities.
This implies that a high degree of frictional wage dispersion and a high value of the average
1Our paper addresses only transitions of workers from one employer to another. We do not consider
promotions within a given firm.
1
job finding rate may coexist at the same time. Second, Nagypál (2008) finds that average
wage contract duration is overestimated when employment-to-employment transitions are
not taken into account.
In particular, we modify the Mortensen & Pissarides (1994) set up as follows. Each
firm-worker pair is characterized by its idiosyncratic productivity level, which is constant
throughout the whole duration of the match. Search effort of both employed and un-
employed job searchers is endogenous. All firm-worker matches are subject to exogenous
and endogenous job separation hazard. Variations in the endogenous job separation mar-
gin are driven by aggregate productivity shocks. On-the-job search is motivated by the
chance of finding a better job opportunity that promises (i) a higher real wage rate and
(ii) a lower hazard of endogenous separation. An unemployed job searcher accepts any
job offer, while an employed job searcher accepts a job offer (and quits the old job) only
if it includes a higher surplus share.
We calibrate the model in order to match the empirical evidence presented in Nagypál
(2008). Accordingly, conditional on not leaving the labor force, about 2/3 of all workers
who separate from their employer are matched with a new one in the following month. In
addition to that, the assumption of variable on-the-job search and endogenous job sepa-
ration shocks helps us to replicate the observation that on-the-job search is most intense
among workers in low-wage matches close to the separation margin (Fallick & Fleischman
2004, Christensen et al. 2005). Thus, our model is consistent with the empirical observa-
tion that (i) employment-to-employment transition rates are highest in matches that pay
low wages and (ii) the aggregate employment-to-employment transition rate is slightly
below the value of 3%.
High employment-to-employment transition rates imply that low-wage matches exhibit
a high option value of labor market search. This stimulates unemployed job searchers to
accept such offers and to search on-the-job for better employment opportunities. More-
over, we note that the expected duration of low-wage job matches is far below the aver-
age. Consequently, our calibrated model is able to generate a mean-min-ratio equal to
1.3. Compared to the value provided by Hornstein et al. (2007), the percentage difference
between the average and the lowest wage paid rises by an order of a magnitude. There-
fore, we conclude that the introduction of variable on-the-job search into a model with
endogenous job separations is an effective means to generate frictional wage dispersion.
In addition, we examine the dynamic behavior of the model at the business cycle fre-
quencies. Our analysis focuses on the cyclical movements of vacancies, unemployment,
and the real wage rate. Interest in this issue has been sparked by the influential paper
of Shimer (2005), which states that the job matching model with exogenous separations
(Pissarides 1985) is not able to replicate the high degree of labor market volatility. Fur-
thermore, Mortensen & Nagypál (2008) point out that counter-cyclical fluctuations in the
endogenous separation margin are able to amplify the variations in the number of unem-
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ployed job searchers on the one hand. On the other hand, these strong counter-cyclical
movements provide firms incentives to open more vacancies during economic downturns.
Hence, the model generated Beveridge curve may be counter-factually positively sloped.
In our model, on the contrary, variable on-the-job search uncouples aggregate search ef-
fort from the number of unemployed job searchers. Since on-the-job search is pro-cyclical,
we note that total search effort, i.e. the sum of all effort undertaken by employed and
unemployed job searchers, is relatively stable over the business cycle. This stimulates
firms to open more vacancies when aggregate productivity is high. As a consequence, our
model is able to replicate a negatively sloped Beveridge curve.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model
environment. Section 3 calibrates the model and evaluates its quantitative performance
against US data. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model Environment
2.1 Employment Relationships
There is a continuum of ex-ante identical workers in the economy, having unit mass
and a continuum of potential firms, having infinite mass. Both firms and workers are
risk-neutral. Production takes place in one-firm-one-worker matches. Each active match
produces output according to a linear technology: y(a, t) = azt. We assume that match-
specific idiosyncratic productivity level a is constant throughout the whole duration of
the match. The exogenous distribution of a is described by the cumulative distribution
function P (a) with support [0,∞). Aggregate productivity zt, instead, is subject to an
exogenous shock specified by following autoregressive process:
ln(zt) = (1− ̺) ln(z¯) + ̺ ln(zt−1) + ǫt with ǫt ∼ N (0, σ2ǫ ) and iid. (1)
2.2 The Labor Market
In the beginning of period t, there are Nt matched firm-worker pairs. The endogenous
distribution of firm-worker pairs over idiosyncratic productivity levels is described by a
cumulative distribution function G(a, t) with support [0,∞). All firm-worker pairs face
exogenous separation with probability ρx. In addition, a match may be separated if its
idiosyncratic productivity level is below the current reservation productivity ar,t. Workers
who lose their job, whether for exogenous or endogenous reasons, immediately enter the
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period t matching pool. Hence, the unemployment rate Ut is given by the share of workers
who are not engaged in active employment relationships:2
Ut = 1−Nt(1− ρx)
∫ ∞
ar,t
g(a, t)da.
Labor market search takes place parallel to production. The pool of job searchers
comprises all unemployed and all employed workers who search on-the-job for better
employment opportunities. Search effort of both, unemployed and employed job searchers,
is endogenous. Unemployed job searchers are identical and, hence, search all with the
same intensity eu,t on the labor market. The search effort of an employed worker ew(a, t)
depends on her idiosyncratic productivity level a. Thus, aggregate search effort Et is
given by:
Et = Uteu,t +Nt(1− ρx)
∫ ∞
ar,t
ew(a, t)g(a, t)da.
Search effort of unemployed and employed job searchers incurs a cost. In particular,
we assume that the respective cost functions are given as:
c [eu,t] = ζu [eu,t]
φu , c [ew(a, t)] = ζw [ew(a, t)]
φw ,
where the parameter φi, i = u,w captures the fact that the level and the curvature of the
search cost function may depend on the employment status.
Besides the pool of job searchers, the period t matching market consists of the aggre-
gate number of vacancies Vt. Firms with unfilled positions may decide whether or not to
post a vacancy, where posting a vacancy entails a cost κ per period. Free entry into the
matching market determines the aggregate number of posted vacancies.
New matches are formed at the end of period t. The number of newly formed firm-
worker pairs is given by a Cobb-Douglas matching function with constant returns to scale.
This function relates aggregate job matches Mt to aggregate vacancies Vt and aggregate
search effort Et:
M(Vt, Et) = min
[
χV γt E
1−γ
t , Vt, 1
]
,
where χ is a constant scaling factor.
The ratio between aggregate vacancies and aggregate search effort measures the tight-
ness of the labor market. By linear homogeneity of the matching function, the matching
2Our model abstracts from movements into and out of the labor force.
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probability per unit search effort f(θt), and the matching rate per vacancy q(θt), respec-
tively, depend solely on the value of market tightness θt:
f(θt) =
M(Vt, Et)
Et
= χ
(
Vt
Et
)γ
= χθγt , (2)
q(θt) =
M(Vt, Et)
Vt
= χ
(
Vt
Et
)γ−1
= χθγ−1. (3)
The tighter the labor market, the longer the expected time to fill a vacancy, but
the shorter the expected search for a job (and vice versa). The fact that firms and
households do not internalize these adverse effects on the aggregate return rates gives rise
to congestion externalities.
Labor market search and match formation entails that the employment distribution
in the beginning of period t+ 1 is given by:
Nt+1
∫ a
0
g(a, t+ 1)da =
∫ a
0

Utf(θt)eu,tp(a) + (4)
Ia>ar,t(1− ρ
x)(1− τ(a, t))Ntg(a, t) +
(1− ρx)Ntf(θt)
(∫ a
ar,t
ew(a′, t)g(a′, t)da′
)
p(a)

da,
where I is an indicator function equal to zero if a is below the current reservation pro-
ductivity ar,t, and otherwise equal to one. The right hand side of equation (4) is made
up of (i) the mass of unemployed job searchers who succeed in meeting an employer, (ii)
the distribution of workers in existing job matches that experience neither job separation
nor a transition (with probability 1 − τ(a, t)) to a new employer and, (iii) the distribu-
tion of new job matches established by successful employment-to-employment transitions.
Evaluating equation (4) at a→∞ yields a more familiar law of motion:
Nt+1 = (1− ρx)Nt[1−G(ar,t)] + f(θt)eu,tUt.
2.3 The Joint Surplus
Let the value of unemployment to a worker be Ut, the value of a vacancy to a firm be
Vt, the value of a match to a worker be W(a, t), and the value of a match to a firm be
J (a, t). Hence, the joint surplus of an active match S(a, t) is given by the value of output
y(a, t), net of expenses for search on-the-job c [ew(a, t)] and the joint outside alternative
(Ut + Vt), plus the joint continuation value of the current match C(a, t) in the future:
S(a, t) = y(a, t)− c [ew(a, t)]− (Ut + Vt) + C(a, t). (5)
5
The joint surplus is divided by Nash (1953) bargaining. Consequently, the firm gains
period-by-period the fixed portion ξ, while the share 1 − ξ is allocated to the worker.
We assume that wage bargaining takes place in the beginning of period t, but after the
employed worker has made her search decision. This timing assumption has two important
implications. First, employed workers who have just made a transition to a new employer
are not able to resume their old position. Therefore, the outside alternative of all workers
is equal to the value of unemployment. Second, the bargaining outcome does not influence
the search decision of the worker. Thus, the surplus shares are given as:3
ξS(a, t) = J (a, t)− Vt, (1− ξ)S(a, t) =W(a, t)− Ut. (6)
Equation (6) shows that the surplus share of the firm equals the value of an active
match to the firm J (a, t) net of the value of an unfilled vacancy Vt. The surplus share
of the worker equals the value of an active match to the worker W(a, t) net of the value
of unemployment Ut. Furthermore, the Nash sharing rule implies that any endogenous
separation decision is made by mutual consent. Consequently, the current reservation
productivity ar,t has to satisfy the following job separation condition:
S(ar,t, t) = 0 ⇔ y(ar,t, t)− c[ew(ar,t, t)] + C(ar,t, t) = Ut + Vt.
2.4 The Problem of an Unemployed Job Searcher
We now examine the decision problem of an unemployed job searcher. There is a contin-
uum of ex-ante unemployed job searchers in the economy, having mass Ut. All unemployed
job searchers take the aggregate matching rate per unit search effort ft as given and search
eu,t units on the labor market. Hence, an unemployed job searcher can expect to meet a
firm at the rate:
f˜(eu,t, θt) = fteu,t. (7)
When an unemployed job searcher meets a firm at the end of period t, the pair draws
its idiosyncratic productivity level a, which is constant throughout the whole duration
of the match. Given that next period’s reservation productivity ar,t+1 is still unknown,
unemployed job searchers accept every match for the moment. If the match survives
3The present timing assumption is clearly a simplification. However, to our knowledge, there is
no study investigating all aspects of a multi-player bargaining game under variable on-the-job search.
Cahuc et al. (2006) examine the implications of a multi-player bargaining game, where the search intensity
of employed job searchers is constant (Burdett & Mortensen 1998). They demonstrate that between-firm
competition increases the average wage rate if employed job searchers can resume their old positions.
Papp (2009) examines the implications of this approach in a general equilibrium model. On the other
hand, Shimer (2006) analyzes a strategic bargaining game between an employed job searcher and a single
firm, where the firm is willing to offer a higher wage rate in order to reduce the extent of transitions to
other employers. Indeed, the examination of these questions in a stochastic environment is beyond the
scope of this paper.
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exogenous destruction at the beginning of period t+1, the firm and the worker observe the
realization of aggregate productivity zt+1 and decide upon endogenous separation. Only
if the idiosyncratic productivity of the firm-worker match is greater than the reservation
productivity a > ar,t+1, the match will become active. Thereby, the reservation strategy
of the worker implies that she gains at least the value of unemployment Ut+1. This setup
implies that the expected value of a match to the worker is given by:
W t =
∫ ∞
0
Wt(a)p(a)da, (8)
where W(a, t) = Ut below the reservation productivity ar,t. Hence, W(a, t) captures not
only the value of active matches, but also the value of matches that are endogenously
terminated. For this reason, the value of unemployment can be written as:
Ut = max
eu,t≥0
{
b− c [eu,t] + βEt
[
(1− ρx)f˜t
(
W t+1 − Ut+1
)
+ Ut+1
]}
. (9)
Each worker who is not engaged in an active employment relationship receives the
flow income b, net of c[eu,t] units search costs. Future utility is discounted at the rate β.
The worker expects to find an average job in period t + 1 with probability (1 − ρx) f˜t.
In this case, the worker gains the expected surplus share (W t+1 −Ut+1). In addition, the
unemployed worker will receive at least the value of unemployment Ut+1 – independent of
whether or not she succeeds in finding an active employment relationship.
Consequently, the search effort choice eu,t of an unemployed worker has to satisfy
following first order condition:
c′ [eu,t] = (1− ρx)ftβEt
{
W t+1 − Ut+1
}
. (10)
The first order condition of an unemployed worker states that the marginal costs of
labor market search (the left hand side) must be equal to the marginal benefits (the right
hand side). The latter is given by the matching rate per unit labor market search ft,
the exogenous destruction rate ρx, and the expected present value of the worker’s surplus
share.
2.5 The Problem of an Employed Job Searcher
Employed workers who search on-the-job for better employment opportunities face the
same meeting rate per unit search effort ft as unemployed job searchers. The search effort
of an employed worker, however, depends on her idiosyncratic productivity level a. Thus,
the expected meeting rate of an employed job searcher is given as: ftew(a, t). Moreover,
the reservation strategy of an employed worker implies that she accepts matches at the
end of period t only if the idiosyncratic productivity of the new match aˆ is strictly larger
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than the one of the old match a. Otherwise, she remains on her old job. Given that the
idiosyncratic productivity level of new matches is drawn from the exogenous distribution
P (a), the current setting implies that an employed job searcher of type a rejects new job
offers at the rate P (a). Hence, the expected employment-to-employment transition rate
of an employed worker with idiosyncratic productivity a reads as:
τ(a, t) = ftew(a, t)[1− P (a)]. (11)
Consequently, the worker’s value of a match with idiosyncratic productivity a can be
written as:
W(a, t) = max
ew(a,t)≥0
{
w(a, t)− c[ew(a, t)] + βEt
{
(12)
(〈
(1− τ(a, t))(1− ρx)
(
W(a, t+ 1)− Ut+1
)〉
+
〈
ftew(a, t)(1− ρx)
∫ ∞
a
(
W(aˆ, t+ 1)− Ut+1
)
p(aˆ)daˆ
〉
+ Ut+1
)}}
.
The worker’s value of a match W(a, t) is given by the real wage rate wa,t, net of
expenses for search on-the-job c[ew(a, t)], and the continuation value of the match to the
worker. The worker’s continuation value is given by (i) the expected surplus share of
the current employment relationship, (ii) the expected surplus share of a prospective job
opportunity with higher (aˆ > a) idiosyncratic productivity, and (iii) the expected present
value of unemployment (the minimum gain of the worker). The first term (i) refers
to the worker who does not find a better employment opportunity, but suffers neither
exogenous nor endogenous job destruction. The second term (ii) characterizes the worker
who succeeds in finding a better job opportunity which survives exogenous and endogenous
job destruction. The third term (iii) applies if the current or the prospective employment
relationship is terminated either for exogenous or endogenous reasons.
When employed workers make their search effort decision, they anticipate the Nash
wage rate w(a, t) correctly. Wage bargaining, however, does not start until the search
effort decision has been made.4 Hence, the optimal search intensity of an employed
worker with idiosyncratic productivity a is given by following first order condition:
c′[ew(a, t)] = ft(1− ρx)βEt
{∫ ∞
a
(
W(aˆ, t+ 1)−W(a, t+ 1)
)
p(aˆ)daˆ
}
. (13)
Equation (13) shows that the search intensity of employed workers decreases in the
idiosyncratic productivity level a. The expected upgrading valueW(aˆ, t+1)−W(a, t+1),
which is determined by the expected surplus from a prospective job opportunity aˆ given
4See Footnote (3).
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the value of the current job a, is highest if the idiosyncratic productivity level a is slightly
above the current reservation productivity level ar,t. Workers engaged in these matches
fear to loose their job in the case of a negative shock to aggregate productivity.
2.6 Optimal Vacancy Posting
There is an infinite mass of firms with unfilled positions. Each firm with an unfilled
position may decide whether or not to post a vacancy. Equation (3) shows that a firm
with an open vacancy expects to meet a job searcher at rate q(θt). However, the firm
anticipates the possibility of meeting an employed job searcher who might reject the job
offer in favor of her old job. Hence, the probability of filling a vacancy q˜t is given by
the probability of meeting a worker q(θt), the job offer acceptance rate (1− ρ
j
t), and the
exogenous separation rate ρx:
q˜t = q(θt)
(
1− ρjt
)
(1− ρx), (14)
where the share of rejected job offers ρjt is given by the number of rejected job offers
divided by the number of aggregate matches:
ρjt =
(
Nt(1− ρx)ft
∫ ∞
ar,t
ew(a, t)P (a)g(a, t)da
)/
Mt. (15)
Since next period’s reservation productivity is still unknown, the firm accepts matches
of any idiosyncratic productivity level a for the moment. When the worker and the firm
decide whether to engage in production in period t + 1, the reservation strategy of the
firm ensures that the value of the match is greater or equal to the value of an unfilled
vacancy Vt. Hence, the expected value of a filled vacancy is given by:
J t =
∫ ∞
0
J (a, t)p(a)da, (16)
where the value of a match to the firm J (a, t) can be written as:
J (a, t) = y(a, t)− w(a, t) + βEt {(1− τ(a, t))(1− ρx)J (a, t+ 1)} . (17)
The firm enjoys the value of production, net of labor costs w(a, t). The firm’s con-
tinuation value is determined by the current employment-to-employment transition rate
τ(a, t), the exogenous job destruction rate ρx, and the expected present value of the current
match in the next period. Furthermore, we note that J (a, t) = Vt below the reservation
productivity ar,t. Hence, J (a, t) measures not only the value of active matches, but also
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the value of matches that are consensually terminated. Hence, the value of an unfilled
vacancy is given by:
Vt = −κ+ βEt
[
q˜tJ t+1 + (1− q˜t)Vt+1
]
. (18)
Recall that posting a vacancy entails a cost κ per period. Therefore, the firm expects to
gain the value of a filled vacancy J t with probability q˜t. Otherwise, the vacancy remains
unfilled. Free entry into the matching market ensures that the firm’s outside option, i.e.
the value of an unfilled vacancy, is zero in every period: Vt = 0. Thus, the number of
posted vacancies has to satisfy following condition:
κ
q˜t
= βEtJ t+1. (19)
2.7 The Wage Function
Using the Nash sharing rule (6), the value of a match to the worker (12), and the value of
a match to the firm (17), the joint surplus of the match (5) can be rewritten as follows:
S(a, t) = y(a, t)− c[e∗w(a, t)]− Ut − Vt + (20)
βEt
{〈
(1− τ(a, t))(1− ρx)S(a, t+ 1)
〉
+
〈
ftew(a, t)(1− ρx)
∫ ∞
a
(1− ξ)S(aˆ, t+ 1)p(aˆ)daˆ
〉
+ Ut+1
}
.
where e∗w(a, t) satisfies equation (13).
Equation (20) shows that the joint continuation value of the match consists of (i) the
option value of the current match, (ii) the option value of on-the-job search, and (iii)
the option value of unemployment. Thereby, only the benefits of on-the-job search going
to the worker (1− ξ)S(aˆ, t+ 1) enter the mutual surplus, while the benefits going to the
new employer ξS(aˆ, t+ 1) are not taken into account. Furthermore, the Nash bargaining
solution entails following real wage function, depending on the idiosyncratic productivity
level a:
w(a, t) = (1− ξ)y(a, t) + ξ (c[e∗w(a, t)] + Ut)− (21)
ξβEt
{〈
ftew(a, t)(1− ρx)
∫ ∞
a
(1− ξ)S(aˆ, t+ 1)p(aˆ)daˆ
〉
+ Ut+1
}
.
The real wage rate is given by the weighted average of (i) the value of production
and (ii) the value of unemployment, plus compensation for search on-the-job, minus the
option value of on-the-job search to the worker. The positive option value to the worker
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reduces her reservation wage. Therefore, we observe that the Nash wage in our model
with on-the-job search is lower than in the baseline matching model.
2.8 Equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium is given by the unemployment rate Ut, the aggregate number
of vacancies Vt, the search effort of unemployed workers eu,t, the function of employed
workers’ search effort ew(a, t), the distribution of firm-worker matches G(a, t), and a wage
function w(a, t), such that:
• Ut and W(a, t) are the value of unemployment and of a match, respectively, for
workers making optimal search effort decisions, given Ut, Vt, Et, w(a, t), and G(a, t).
ew(a, t) and eu,t are the corresponding optimal search effort policies.
• Vt and J (a, t) are the value of a vacancy and of a match for firms making optimal
vacancy creation decisions, given Ut, Vt, Et, w(a, t), ew(a, t), eu,t, and G(a, t).
• Total factor productivity zt follows the exogenous stochastic process (1).
• There is free entry into the matching pool of vacancies.
• New firm-worker matches draw their idiosyncratic productivity a from an exoge-
nously given distribution P (a).
• Wages are set by sharing the surplus of an active firm-worker match in fractions ξ
and 1− ξ, respectively, given the wage function w(a, t).
• The distribution G(a, t), the unemployment rate Ut, the aggregate number of va-
cancies Vt, and the total search effort Et are consistent with the decisions of the
agents in the economy.
• An initial condition for the share of matched firm worker pairs N0 is given.
3 Model Evaluation
3.1 Computational Issues
We analyze the cyclical properties of the model economy by value function iteration on a
discrete state space. Thereby, the treatment of the endogenous productivity distribution
as an endogenous state variable establishes a computational challenge. Particularly, as
in the case of endogenous separations the endogenous productivity distribution exhibits
a discontinuity at the reservation productivity ar,t. This might be the reason why only
a small number of authors so far have addressed the issue of on-the-job search in a job
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matching model. Among others, Nagypál (2005) examines the stationary equilibrium of
a job matching model with variable on-the-job search, where idiosyncratic productivity
shocks lead to endogenous separations. She concludes that workers close to the endoge-
nous separation margin show the highest intensity of on-the-job search. In a companion
paper, Nagypál (2007) considers a log-linear approximation around the non-stochastic
steady state. However, in order to ensure differentiability of the endogenous distribu-
tion, the model drops the assumption of endogenous separations. On the contrary, Fahr
(2007) argues that firm-worker pairs are subject to noisy signals about the idiosyncratic
productivity level. This implies that some profitable matches separate endogenously by
mistake, while some non-profitable matches are continued. Thus, the discontinuity at
the reservation productivity may be smoothed out by a logistic distribution. For this
reason, the model with on-the-job search and endogenous separations can be solved by
a linear approximation. Tasci (2007) extends the model by Pries & Rogerson (2005) in
order to allow for exogenous on-the-job search. In this setting, it suffices to approximate
the worker’s acceptance probability. For this purpose, the algorithm by Krusell & Smith
(1998) is utilized. Krause & Lubik (2007) assume segregated markets for good and bad
jobs, where separations are exogenous and constant in both market segments. Finally,
Menzio & Shi (2009) introduce on-the-job search into a model of directed search akin to
Moen (1997). They demonstrate that, in this setting, the agents’ decisions are indepen-
dent of the endogenous productivity distribution.
Instead, our approach is based on the observation that, in the US, the half life de-
viation of the actual unemployment rate from its stationary value is close to one month
(Elsby et al. 2009). Consequently, the correlation between the stationary rate and the
actual unemployment rate in the following month is very close to unity (Shimer 2007).
Since the lag is so short, Hall (2009) suggests neglecting the fact that the unemployment
rate is governed by a backward-looking law of motion. In addition, as described above, we
note that the flow of workers from one employer to another is more than twice as large as
the flow from unemployment to employment. For this reason, we treat neither the unem-
ployment rate nor the corresponding endogenous productivity distribution as endogenous
state variables. The only state variable in our model is aggregate productivity.
3.2 Calibration
In order to capture the high transition rates in the US economy, we calibrate the model
so that one period corresponds to one month. When simulating the model, we time-
aggregate the artificial series to quarterly data and evaluate it against the quarterly US
time series. Table 1 summarizes the parameter values of our model.
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Preferences Workers are risk-neutral and supply labor inelastically. The discount fac-
tor β is chosen to match an annual real interest rate of 4 percent (Kydland & Prescott
1982). Furthermore, estimates by Christensen et al. (2005) and Yashiv (2000) for em-
ployed and unemployed job searchers, respectively, indicate that both types of job search-
ers face a quadratic cost of search effort, i.e. φe = φu = 2 and ζe = ζu = 1/2.
Matching and the Labor Market We target an average unemployment rate U = 10%
and a workers’ meeting rate f˜t = 27% (Hall 2006). These figures refer to the offi-
cially unemployed job searchers plus the pool of marginally attached non-participants
(Jones & Riddell 1999). Our calibrated value of unemployment benefits b = 0.85, to-
gether with the implied average value of search disutility (c[e∗w] = 0.14) and average
output per worker y¯ = 1.25, yields a replacement rate equal to 0.56. This value lies
within the range found in the literature.5 Targets for the transition rate out of employ-
ment are provided by Hall (2006). Therefore, we set the exogenous separation rate ρx
to 0.0275. Furthermore, our calibration implies that the endogenous separation rate ρn
is close to 0.01, and the average employment-to-employment transition rate τ is equal to
0.04. Beside that, we choose the firm’s bargaining power ξ = 0.25 and the per-period
vacancy posting cost κ = 0.06, such that the unemployment rate and the percentage of
vacancy posting costs in aggregate output (κV )/Y = 1.9% are in line with our targets.
The latter value implies that the steady-state asset value of a match to the firm is equal
to 19% of average output (Yashiv 2000). Finally, we calibrate the two parameters of the
matching function. First, we set the matching function constant χ equal to 0.45.6 Sec-
ond, we calibrate the matching elasticity of vacancies η equal to 0.5, which is within the
plausible range [0.3− 0.5] proposed by Petrongolo & Pissarides (2001).
Productivity We approximate the stochastic process (Equation 1) with a discrete val-
ued first-order Markov process using the method by Tauchen (1986). Thereby, we use the
values (̺ = 0.97, σǫ = 0.007) suggested by Hagedorn & Manovskii (2008).7 The number
of grid points in the state space is set equal to 29. The exogenous productivity distri-
bution is assumed to be log-normal with mean µ = 1 and a standard deviation equal to
σp = 0.1. We compute the exogenous and the endogenous productivity distribution, P (a)
and G(a) respectively, on a very fine grid with 500 points between 0.7 and 1.5.
5The value used by Shimer (2005), b = 0.4, comprises only pecuniary benefits and, thus, is consid-
ered to be a lower bound. Values beyond are usually justified by the reference to “leisure gain from
unemployment”. Angerhausen et al. (2010) provide a microfoundation for this claim, while the results
of Costain & Reiter (2008) indicate that this “gain” is quantitatively important. An upper bound is
provided by the estimate b = 0.95 of Hagedorn & Manovskii (2008), who attempt to match the elasticity
of the real wage rate.
6As argued by Shimer (2005), the model allows the normalization of this value.
7The published version of the model is calibrated so that one period corresponds to one week. Please re-
fer to the working paper version (available at: http://www.econ.umn.edu/macro/2005/hagedorn.pdf)
for the monthly calibration.
13
3.3 Steady State Analysis
The Endogenous Productivity Distribution Figure (1a) displays the probability
density function of the exogenous productivity distribution P (a), represented by a blue
line, as well as the endogenous productivity distribution at 5 different levels of aggregate
productivity (at grid points 1, 8, 15, 22, and 29), after endogenous separation has taken
place. Grid point 15 (turquoise line) represents the stochastic steady state. The graph
clearly shows that the positive selection of employed workers towards matches with higher
idiosyncratic productivity shifts the endogenous distribution to the right. In the steady
state, average match quality is about 25% higher than the mean of the exogenous pro-
ductivity distribution. Moreover, we note that the impact of aggregate productivity on
average match quality follows a non-linear pattern (Figure 1b). The slope of the right
tail is much steeper than the slope of the left tail. This suggests that the channel from
aggregate productivity to average match quality is shaped by two opposing effects. On
the one hand, recessions destroy low-quality matches which are likely to be profitable
during economic upswings. This is referred to as the “cleansing” effect of recessions
(Caballero & Hammour 1994). On the other hand, we observe that search intensity of
on-the-job searchers is pro-cyclical (Figure 1d). Consequently, the number of employment-
to-employment transitions is pro-cyclical as well (Figure 1f). This implies that recessions
are times when workers tend to stay in low quality matches. Barlevy (2002) refers to
this as the “sullying” effect of recessions. In our calibrated model, the “sullying” effect is
dominant. Therefore, average match quality is pro-cyclical. Nevertheless, the flat shape
of the left tail shows that also the “cleansing” effect is present.
The Average Real Wage Rate The evolution of average match quality over the
business cycle has important implications for the dynamic behavior of the real wage rate.
In the presence of period-by-period Nash bargaining, both variables are linked very closely.
This is manifested by Figure 1b. Individual wages, instead, increase monotonously in
aggregate productivity (Figure 1g). This finding indicates that our model may be able
to match an important empirical observation. Several authors, among others Solon et al.
(1994), Bowlus et al. (2002) and Hart (2006), report that individual wage profiles are
strongly pro-cyclical. Aggregate data, however, show (at most) a weakly pro-cyclical
pattern. The literature argues that the apparent discrepancy is due to the fact that
aggregate data often neglects the cyclical variations in the average match quality. Our
model seems to be consistent with this claim.
Frictional Wage Dispersion Furthermore, we observe that the real wage rate paid
in the least productive active match is essentially independent of aggregate productivity
(Figure 1g). Consequently, the ratio between the average and the lowest wage paid in
the economy, the so-called “mean-min-ratio”, follows a similar pattern as the average
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real wage rate (Figure 1h). The mean-min-ratio measures the degree of frictional wage
dispersion, i.e. wage differentials among ex-ante identical workers. Hornstein et al. (2007)
demonstrate that the job matching model without on-the-job search is unable to match
the high degree of frictional wage dispersion found in the data. In the US, the average
wage paid to similar workers is about 70% higher than the lowest wage within the set.
In contrast, the mean-min ratio generated by a reasonably calibrated version of the job
matching model without on-the-job search is not significantly different from unity. In
our calibrated model, the steady state value of the mean-min-ratio is equal to 1.4. Thus,
our model is able to explain about one-half of the empirical degree of frictional wage
dispersion.
Hornstein et al. (2007) argue that the inclusion of on-the-job search is essential for gen-
erating these results. In the presence of high job finding rates, unemployed job searchers
have no incentive to accept a long-term job that pays a low wage rate. With on-the-job
search, employed workers are more likely to accept low wage offers for the moment and
continue to seek for better employment opportunities. However, a model with exogenous
on-the-job search (Burdett & Mortensen 1998) requires far too high EE-transition rates
in order to replicate the degree of frictional wage dispersion found in the data. For this
reason, we introduce variable on-the-job search and endogenous separations. These two
modifications allow us to concentrate on-the-job search among workers in low quality
matches. These workers have (i) a large probability of finding a better employment op-
portunity and (ii) a high probability of entering unemployment. Therefore, our model
is able to generate significant frictional wage dispersion. At the same time, the share of
employed workers who change employer each month is very close to the empirical value
of 3% (Figure 1f).
On-the-Job Search Figure (1c) illustrates the search effort decision of employed and
unemployed job searchers, respectively. The horizontal lines represent the effort per un-
employed job searcher, which depends only on the level of aggregate productivity. The
search effort choice of employed job searchers, instead, is a function of aggregate and
idiosyncratic productivity. As expected, search effort of any type of worker rises with ag-
gregate productivity, while search effort of employed job searchers falls with idiosyncratic
productivity. This happens for two reasons. First, the probability of finding a better
employment opportunity is smaller the higher the quality of the current match. Second,
the hazard of endogenous job separation decreases with the distance to the current reser-
vation productivity. We observe that the search behavior of an employed worker at the
reservation productivity (the “marginal” worker) is almost identical to the search behavior
of an unemployed. Due to the low reservation productivity, these workers are (i) likely to
find a better employment opportunity and (ii) face a huge endogenous separation hazard
in the case of a negative productivity shock. Moreover, we note that the bulk of employed
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workers, i.e. workers in matches with idiosyncratic productivity a > 1.1, do not make any
significant effort to find a new employer. This observation is consistent with the findings
by Fallick & Fleischman (2004) and Christensen et al. (2005).
Total search effort, i.e. the sum of all effort undertaken by employed and unem-
ployed job searchers, seems to be relatively stable (Figure 1d). The composition, however,
changes considerably over the business cycle. Search effort of employed job searchers rises
with aggregate productivity, since there are more on-the-job searchers (extensive mar-
gin) who search more than the employed workers already in place (intensive margin).
In particular, note that the search effort of a given employed worker increases only by
little when economic conditions improve. This indicates that escaping from imminent
unemployment is probably the main motive for on-the-job search. In addition to that,
we observe that aggregate search effort of unemployed job searchers is counter-cyclical.
Even though the search intensity per unemployed job searcher rises (intensive margin,
see Figure 1c), the number of unemployed job searchers declines sharply during economic
upswings (extensive margin, see Figure 2b). This implies that a firm is much more likely
to meet an employed job searcher when aggregate productivity is high.
Employment-to-Employment Transitions Figure (1e) presents the rates at which
employed workers find new employers. Given that the meeting rate per unit search effort
is not very elastic, EE-transition rates follow the same pattern as search intensity of
employed workers. Consequently, marginal workers enjoy almost the same transition
probability (well above 30%) as unemployed job searchers during economic booms (grid
point 29). During recessions (grid point 1), on the contrary, the EE-transition rate of
marginal workers is only slightly above 10%. The job finding rate of unemployed job
searchers, on the other hand, never falls below a value of 25%. The huge differences
in the transition probabilities of marginal workers may help to explain the shape of the
endogenous productivity distribution at the reservation productivity (Figure 1a). When
aggregate productivity is low, the endogenous productivity distribution exhibits a clear
cut-off point. Yet, when aggregate productivity is high, we observe that the endogenous
productivity distribution is very smooth.
Aggregate Labor Market Dynamics In addition, our model allows analyzing the
cyclical behavior of the labor market. Interest in this issue has been sparked by the
influential paper of Shimer (2005). The survey paper by Yashiv (2008) provides a gen-
eral picture of US labor market dynamics over the business cycle. Accordingly, gross
worker flows between employment and unemployment are counter-cyclical and volatile.
On the one hand, counter-cyclical flows from employment to unemployment are driven
by counter-cyclical movements in the job separation margin (Fujita 2009). On the other
hand, counter-cyclical flows from unemployment to employment are due to the fact that
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the percentage fall in the job finding rate is smaller than the percentage rise in the un-
employment rate in the aftermath of a negative productivity shock (Fallick & Fleischman
2004). This implies that the number of unemployed job searchers is strongly counter-
cyclical. As pointed out by Mortensen & Nagypál (2008), such a scenario might give
firms incentives to open more vacancies during economic downturns. Hence, the model
generated Beveridge curve may be counter-factually positively sloped. In the case of
variable on-the-job search, however, total search effort is uncoupled from the number of
unemployed job searchers. For this reason, strong counter-cyclical movements in the ag-
gregate unemployment rate do not necessarily induce counter-cyclical variations in the
number of posted vacancies.
Figure (2a) shows that gross worker flows between employment and unemployment are,
indeed, counter-cyclical.8 The flow of employed workers into unemployment is determined
by exogenous and endogenous separation (Figure 2d).9 The graph depicting the aggregate
unemployment rate (Figure 2b) clearly demonstrates that the number of unemployed job
searchers rises during economic downturns.
The flow of workers from unemployment into employment, as displayed in Figure (2a),
represents all unemployed job searchers that succeed in meeting an employer at the end of
period t−1. Since the reservation productivity at time t is still unknown, unemployed job
searchers accept matches of any quality for the moment. Whether meeting an employer
actually results in finding an active match in period t, depends on the realization of
aggregate productivity. Therefore, Figure (2c) gives the worker’s expected meeting rate,
represented by a blue line, and the job finding rate, represented by a pink line. We observe
that both transition rates are pro-cyclical. This is due to the fact that more unemployed
job searchers compete for fewer vacancies during economic downturns. Moreover, the
counter-cyclical flow in Figure (2a) suggests that the percentage rise in the number of
unemployed job searchers is larger than the percentage fall in the worker’s meeting rate.
Turning to the set of unmatched firms that have posted a vacancy (Figure 2e), we
note that there are three different transition rates. The firms’ meeting rate, represented
by a blue line, gives the rate at which a firm can expect to meet a worker at the end of
period t − 1. As some employed job searchers will immediately reject the offer (Figure
2f), the pink line gives the rate at which a firm can expect to be matched with a worker
at the beginning of period t. In addition to that, some matches will be separated in the
beginning of period t, due to exogenous and endogenous job separation. Hence, the yellow
line shows at which rate a firm can actually expect to find an active job match in period t.
8All graphs in Figure (2) represent stationary values, given different values of aggregate productivity.
Consequently, the flow from employment to unemployment is always identical to the flow into the opposite
direction.
9As the graphs depict stationary values, all endogenous separations at time t are due to newly formed
matches in period t− 1 that do not become active in period t. In addition to that, we observe a spike in
the endogenous separation rate every time the level of aggregate productivity decreases.
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Finally, note that the introduction of variable on-the-job search uncouples aggregate
search effort from the number of unemployed job searchers (Figure 1d). For this reason,
the ratio of vacancies to the number of unemployed job searchers is no longer identical
to “labor market tightness”, i.e. the ratio of vacancies to total search effort. Since on-
the-job search is pro-cyclical, we observe that total search effort, i.e. the sum of all
effort undertaken by employed and unemployed job searchers, is relatively stable over the
business cycle. This stimulates firms to open more vacancies when aggregate productivity
is high (Figure 2h). Consequently, we observe that the ratio of vacancies to unemployed
job searchers is clearly pro-cyclical (Figure 2g). Labor market tightness, instead, is much
less elastic. This indicates that the negative feedback effect of labor market tightness on
vacancy creation, which prevails in the standard job matching model, is much weaker in
a model with variable on-the-job search.
In summary, we notice that our model replicates salient features of the US labor
market. Gross worker flows between employment and unemployment are counter-cyclical.
Vacancies are pro-cyclical, while the number of unemployed job searchers is counter-
cyclical. Hence, the model generated Beveridge curve is positively sloped.
3.4 Business Cycle Analysis
This section examines the quantitative performance of the job matching model with vari-
able on-the-job search. We evaluate the model against business cycle moments of the
US labor market from 1955:1 to 2008:4 (Table 2a). All data are logged and de-trended
using a Hodrick & Prescott (1997) filter with smoothing parameter 1600. As a measure
of aggregate activity we choose output per worker. We observe that both vacancies and
unemployment are very volatile and very persistent. Vacancies are pro-cyclical, but the
unemployment rate is counter-cyclical. The average real wage rate is less volatile than out-
put per worker. In addition, we analyze whether the model is able to replicate the pattern
of a relative stable total separation rate (Hall 2006), which is due to the offsetting behav-
ior of its components (Nagypál 2008). In particular, the employment-to-unemployment
(EU) transition rate is counter-cyclical, the employment-to-employment (EE) transition
rate is pro-cyclical, and the employment to out-of-the labor force (EO) transition rate
is essentially a-cyclical. Furthermore, Nagypál (2008) estimates that 50 to 60% of the
volatility in the unemployment rate is due to composition changes in the total separation
rate. The remaining share is caused by variations in the job finding rate.
As demonstrated by Shimer (2005), the baseline job matching model without on-the-
job search is not able to replicate this pattern. The average real wage moves almost
one-to-one with output per worker, providing firms not enough incentives to amplify the
supply of vacancies over the business cycle. Hence, the model is not able to match the
high degree of labor market volatility found in the data (Table 2b). Moreover, we note
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that all model generated time series closely follow the exogenous stochastic process. This
result suggests that the internal propagation mechanism of the matching model without
physical capital is very weak. Besides, due to the exogenous separation margin, we observe
that the model generated flow from employment to unemployment is, by construction,
pro-cyclical (Davis 2006). This implies that the baseline job matching model is not able
to account for the composition changes in the total separation rate. Instead, all variation
in the aggregate unemployment rate is attributed to the job creation margin.
Table 2c presents the second moments of our calibrated model. We observe that the
inclusion of variable on-the-job search increases the volatility of vacancies and unemploy-
ment significantly. Compared to the baseline model, the volatility of unemployment rises
by more than an order of a magnitude. This enormous rise is due to the counter-cyclical
variations in the endogenous separation margin. Figure (3) illustrates that recessions
involve a spike in the number of job separations. The unemployment rate tracks these
movements almost exactly. On the other hand, the volatility of vacancies rises only mod-
estly when variable on-the-job search is introduced. This result suggests that our model
generates most of the volatility in unemployment along the job separation margin, and
only little along the job creation margin.
This is a well-known problem in job matching models with endogenous separations
(Mortensen & Nagypál 2008), where counter-cyclical fluctuations in the job separation
margin may induce strong counter-cyclical movements in the number of unemployed job
searchers. Without on-the-job search, when aggregate search effort is directly linked
to the number of unemployed job searchers, these movements stimulate firms to open
more vacancies when aggregate productivity is low. In other words, the model generated
Beveridge curve is positively sloped. This is in stark contrast to the data. Our model,
however, uncouples total search effort from the number of unemployed job searchers.
Since on-the-job search is pro-cyclical, aggregate search effort is relatively stable over the
business cycle. Hence, consistent with the data, we observe that firms post more vacancies
when aggregate productivity is high. Yet, the degree of amplification remains below the
empirical estimate.
The main reason for the low volatility of vacancies is the fact that on-the-job search
involves job offer rejections (Figure 2f). Firms suffer from job offer rejections by employed
job searchers who prefer to stay in their old jobs. Each job offer rejection implies that the
sunk cost of labor market search is lost. This effect discourages firms to open vacancies.
Nevertheless, our model is able to generate a pro-cyclical time path of vacancies. This
partial success is due to the impact of two effects. First, we observe that only employed
job searchers in low productivity matches make great efforts to find a new employment
opportunity. These workers try to “escape” imminent unemployment and, therefore, tend
to accept most of the job offers. Second, conditional on job offer acceptance, firms enjoy a
higher expected payoff from an employed job searcher than from an unemployed. This is
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due to the fact that employed job searchers accept only attractive job offers and, therefore,
are unlikely to quit later on. Hence, their expected match duration is longer (Nagypál
2007).
Figure (4) presents the cyclical behavior of the total job separation rate and its com-
ponents. The total job separation rate, represented by a yellow line, is made up of (i)
the sum of the exogenous and the endogenous separation rate, represented by a pink line,
and (ii) the employment-to-employment transition rate, represented by a blue line. The
graph shows that the two main components of the total job separation rate are negatively
correlated. The employment-to-employment transition rate is pro-cyclical, while the sum
of the exogenous and the endogenous separation rate is counter-cyclical. The total job
separation rate clearly exhibits less variability than its two main components.
Finally, we recall that our model is able to distinguish between the average real wage
rate the real wage rate of an individual worker.10 The average real wage rate is clearly less
volatile than the real wage rate of an individual worker. The co-movement with output,
however, is almost the same between both variables.
4 Conclusion
This paper addresses the large degree of frictional wage dispersion found in US data.
Hornstein et al. (2007) demonstrate that the average wage paid to observably identical
workers is about 70% higher than the lowest wage in the sample. The standard job
matching model without on-the-job search cannot replicate this pattern. With on-the-job
search, however, unemployed job searchers are more willing to accept low wage offers
since they can continue to seek for better employment opportunities. This explains why
observably identical workers may be paid very different wages. Therefore, we examine the
quantitative implications of variable on-the-job search (Nagypál 2005) in a stochastic job
matching model (Mortensen & Pissarides 1994).
Our key result is that the inclusion of variable on-the-job search increases the degree of
frictional wage dispersion by an order of a magnitude (from about 3% to 40%). Variable
on-the-job search allows us to replicate the fact that search effort is most intense among
workers in low-paid matches close to the separation margin (Fallick & Fleischman 2004,
Christensen et al. 2005). These “marginal” workers try to escape imminent unemployment
and tend to accept most of the job offers (Nagypál 2007). Hence, marginal workers enjoy
very high employment-to-employment transition rates. These high career expectations
stimulate unemployed job searchers to accept such low-paid matches. For this reason, we
observe that the average wage paid to ex-ante identical workers in our model is about
40% higher than the lowest wage in the sample.
10The analyzed individual real wage corresponds to an employed worker with idiosyncratic productivity
level a = 1.1 who stays permanently on the same job.
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Furthermore, we evaluate our modified job matching model at the business cycle fre-
quencies. We observe that counter-cyclical variations in the endogenous job separation
rate amplify the cyclical variations in the aggregate unemployment rate. Indeed, our
model uncouples aggregate search effort from the number of unemployed job searchers.
Since on-the-job search is pro-cyclical, we note that total search effort, i.e. the sum of
all effort undertaken by employed and unemployed job searchers, is relatively stable over
the business cycle. This stimulates firms to open more vacancies when aggregate produc-
tivity is high. As a consequence, we are able to replicate a negatively sloped Beveridge
curve. This is an interesting result, given that models with endogenous separations, but
without on-the-job search, imply that aggregate search effort is strongly counter-cyclical
(Mortensen & Nagypál 2008). Thus, in stark contrast to the data, firms are likely to post
more vacancies when the number of unemployed job searchers is high.
It would be interesting to extend our analysis to a more general wage bargaining set up.
To our knowledge, there is no study investigating all aspects of a multi-player bargaining
game under variable on-the-job search. Cahuc et al. (2006) examine the implications of
a multi-player bargaining game, where the search intensity of employed job searchers is
constant (Burdett & Mortensen 1998). They demonstrate that between-firm competition
increases the average wage rate if employed job searchers can resume their old positions.
Papp (2009) examines the implications of this approach in a general equilibrium model.
On the other hand, Shimer (2006) analyzes a strategic bargaining game between an em-
ployed job searcher and a single firm, where the firm is willing to offer a higher wage rate
in order to reduce the extent of transitions to other employers.
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A Tables
Parameter Description Value Source
U unemployment rate 0.10 Jones & Riddell (1999)
f˜ job finding rate 0.27 Hall (2006)
ρx EU transition rate 0.01 Hall (2006)
ρn EO transition rate 0.03 Hall (2006)
τ EE transition rate 0.04 Hall (2006)
b unemployment benefits 0.85 Costain & Reiter (2008)
ξ firm’s bargaining power 0.25 Yashiv (2000)
κ vacancy posting cost 0.06 Yashiv (2000)
χ matching function constant 0.45 normalization
γ matching elasticity of vacancies 0.50 Petrongolo & Pissarides (2001)
Z number of productivity states 29
m grid width 3 Tauchen (1986)
̺ 1st order autocorrelation 0.97 Hagedorn & Manovskii (2008)11
σǫ standard deviation 0.007 Hagedorn & Manovskii (2008)
Table 1: Calibrated Parameter Values
Y V U V/U W
σ(X) 0.01 0.13 0.11 0.24 0.01
σ(X)/σ(Y/N) 1 14.1 12.0 25.5 0.72
ρ(X,Y/N) 1 0.54 -0.42 0.49 0.38
ρ(Xt, Xt−1) 0.71 0.90 0.89 0.90 0.70
(a) US Business Cycle Facts
Y V U V/U W
σ(X) 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02
σ(X)/σ(Y/N) 1 1.2 0.4 1.6 1
ρ(X,Y/N) 1 1 -0.95 1 0.84
ρ(Xt, Xt−1) 0.78 0.75 0.80 0.78 0.70
(b) Second Moments without On-the-job Search
Y V U V/U W Wi
σ(X) 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.11 0.01 0.01
σ(X)/σ(Y/N) 1 2.9 4.4 7.3 0.54 0.92
ρ(X,Y/N) 1 1 -0.99 0.99 0.97 1
ρ(Xt, Xt−1) 0.77 0.77 0.76 0.77 0.76 0.77
(c) Second Moments with On-the-job Search
Table 2: US Business Cycle Facts and the Corresponding Moments of our Model Economy. All Data are
logged and de-trended with an HP-Filter 1600. All US data (but the real wage) are taken directly from
OECD.Stat. The real wage is constructed using the time series “Compensation of Employees: Wages
and Salary Accruals” and “Total Nonfarm Payrolls: All Employees”.
11See Footnote (7)
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Figure 1: Endogenous Distribution, the Real Wage Rate, and On-the-job Search
26
0,93 0,95 0,96 0,98 1,00 1,02 1,04 1,06 1,08
aggregate productivity
0,026



0,028
0,029
0,03
0,031
g
r
o
s
s
 w
o
r
k
e
r
 f
lo
w
s
EU flow UE flow
(a) Gross Flows
0,93 0,95 0,96 0,98 1,00 1,02 1,04 1,06 1,08
aggregate productivity
0
0,02
0,04
0,06
0,08
0,1
0,12
0,14
0,16
u
n
e
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t 
r
a
te
(b) Unemployment
0,93 0,95 0,96 0,98 1,00 1,02 1,04 1,06 1,08
aggregate productivity
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
tr
a
n
s
it
io
n
 r
a
te
workers' meeting rate job finding rate
(c) Job Finding Rate
0,93 0,95 0,96 0,98 1,00 1,02 1,04 1,06 1,08
aggregate productivity
0
0,001
0,002
0,003
0,004
0,005
0,006



0,008
e
n
d
o
g
e
n
o
u
s
 s
e
p
a
r
a
ti
o
n
 r
a
te
(d) Endogenous Separation Rate
0,93 0,95 0,96 0,98 1,00 1,02 1,04 1,06 1,08
aggregate productivity
0
0,05
0,1
0,15
0,2
0,25
0,3
0,35
0,4
0,45
tr
a
n
s
it
io
n
 r
a
te
firms' meeting rate net of rejections vacancy filling
(e) Vacancy Filling Rate
0,93 0,95 0,96 0,98 1,00 1,02 1,04 1,06 1,08
aggregate productivity
0,53
0,54
0,55
0,56
0,57
0,58
0,59
0,6
0,61
jo
b
 o
ff
e
r
 r
e
je
c
ti
o
n
 r
a
te
(f) Aggregate Rejection Rate
0,93 0,95 0,96 0,98 1,00 1,02 1,04 1,06 1,08
aggregate productivity
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
la
b
o
r
 m
a
r
k
e
t 
ti
g
h
tn
e
s
s
v-u ratio model tightness
(g) Labor Market Tightness
0,93 0,95 0,96 0,98 1,00 1,02 1,04 1,06 1,08
aggregate productivity
0
0,05
0,1
0,15
0,2
0,25
0,3
0,35
0,4
0,45
v
a
c
a
n
c
ie
s
(h) Vacancies
Figure 2: Aggregate Labor Market Dynamics
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Figure 3: Counter-cyclical Spikes in the Separation Rate
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Figure 4: Composition Changes in the Total Separation Rate
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